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Economic integration, the removal of tariff and non-tariff restrictions and the 
unification of economic regulations and policies between different economies is one 
of the most contested issues among economists, political economists and students of 
economic development. It is claimed to produce public goods by some (Baldwin, 
2004; Balassa, 1965), increase patterns of economic and social exclusion by others 
(Bieler 2002, 2006; Bohle 2006, 2009). In these debates a special role is played by 
students of the governance of economic integration who claim that the level of 
progress in, and the developmental outcomes of market integration are largely shaped 
by the way integration is governed (Drezner, 2007; Mattli and Woods, 2014; Offe, 
2014; Bruszt and McDermott, 2014) 
 
The importance of issues linked to governance is underlined by the fact that 
differences in regulatory norms are increasingly seen as the key barriers to the growth 
of regional and global markets, and regulatory disputes make up some of the most 
contentious issues in world politics (Drezner, 2007). Negotiations among the most 
developed economies of the world about regulatory synchronization have made little 
progress in the last decade and nearly all harmonization attempts failed when they 
have involved economies at lower levels of development (Bruszt and McDermott, 
2014)  
 
In a world in which almost all the multilateral efforts at creating common market 
rules fail, and a regional agreement on common rules in a single policy area is 
described as a major breakthrough, the experience of the rapid removal of almost all 
tariffs and the smooth transfer of nearly 80 thousand pages of regulations to the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) in 33 different policy areas might 
offer some interesting lessons.  
 
Explanations for this exceptional success have relied on arguments linked to the 
particulars of the governance of integration, more specifically on the skillful use of 
conditionality linked to EU membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 
Vachudova 2005; Sedelmeier 2011). Citizens in the Eastern peripheries of Europe, the 
argument runs, were ready to make considerable sacrifices for the promise of 
membership in the richest club of the globe. Brussels indeed had exceptional 
leverage, when it has negotiated with countries waiting outside the gates of the EU 
and it has used this leverage well.  
 
Ten years after the CEEC were invited to join the EU the power of such explanations 
necessarily declines. If it is about honoring EU regulations, then by now not so new 
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EU members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) perform at least as well as the 
most developed core economies in Europe, in the absence of even the memories of 
conditionality (Sedelmeier and Epstein 2008; Sedelmeier 2012). The high 
sustainability of the common market rules in these countries represents a challenge to 
explanations relying solely on conditionality and it calls attention to the need to revisit 
issues linked to the definition of the governance problems that had to be addressed 
and the mechanisms of governance that were developed to answer those problems. 
 
In this paper we offer a new perspective on the governance problems of economic 
integration and on the mode of the governance of integration. We draw on the 
enlargement studies by our focus on the governance of rule transfer and also by taking 
seriously issues linked to the incentives and capacities of the rule takers. We depart 
from the enlargement studies by calling attention to the governance problems linked 
the capacities of the rule makers (the integrators) to define and advance their 
interests. We rely on political economy approaches to enlargement that focused on the 
asymmetrical power relations when discussing the interests and strategies of the rule 
makers (Bieler 2002, 2006; Bohle 2006, Jacoby 2010). We depart from them by 
stressing the high level of uncertainty surrounding the issue of what actually was in 
the interest of the rule takers, how they could define and advance these interests. 
More specifically, we stress the uncertainty about the level of interdependence 
between the interests of the integrators and the integrated. Political economists and 
the enlargement studies both treated the interests of rule takers as exogenous to the 
interests of the rule makers, as mere subjects to be managed by the integrator (via 
incentives or capacity building). Instead we argue that the integrator cannot 
completely disregard the interests of the integrated. If the integrator wants to 
maximize his gains and minimize his losses he has to consider the interests of the 
integrated. 
 
To be sure, we accept the claims of both of the above approaches that integration was 
primarily about the imposition of the EU market rules on the accession countries. We, 
however, claim that to achieve this goal the EU had to add the goals of anticipating 
and alleviating potential large-scale negative developmental externalities of rule 
transfer. The goal of the EU was to defend the interests of the integrator by 
simultaneously addressing two fears linked to rule transfer. The first of these fears 
was linked to the potential failure of complete rule transfer; the second fear was 
linked to its eventual success. As for the previous, the fear in that case was that the 
new members will not be capable to play by the EU market rules and that partial 
implementation of the EU rules will undermine the integrity of the EU common 
market and impose high costs on the EU insiders. The latter fear referred to the 
possibility that that the new members will not be able or ready to live by the EU 
market rules; they will not be able to withstand competitive pressure and/or the 
imposition of the EU rules might force on the rule takers economic and/or political 
costs that they will not be able or ready to take. Either way, the potential costs of the 
integration increases and the gains decline if the integrator does not consider tentative 
developmental consequences of imposing EU rules on the integrated. 
 
Considering the developmental interests of the rule takers, we stress, did not mean to 
create positive developmental programs for the integrated economies. The EU 
insiders were not willing and the Commission never had the mandate to consider and 
manage the longer-term developmental consequences of integration in the pre-
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accession period. Catch up growth or economic cohesion was left to participation in 
post-accession Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds programs. The world 
“development” was absent from the vocabulary of the enlargement administration. 
The key reference to potential developmental externalities in EU documents is the 
demand, formulated in a negative way, to keep these economies afloat while 
integrating them in the EU markets. Still, we argue that the EU, and in particular the 
European Commission, shaped developmental outcomes in the accession countries in 
a planned way, more as a by-product of its attempt to ensure acquis compliance. 
 
Redefining the goals of integration made the EU to reconsider the mode of the 
governance of integration. If the integrator could only advance his interests if it 
considered at least partly the interests of the integrated, the governance of integration 
could not solely rely on positive or negative sanctions or even on milder forms of 
nudging. The integrator needed capacities to collect, process, integrate and use 
information efficiently on the potential developmental externalities of rule transfer, on 
the factors that might prevent the adaptation and the sustainability of EU rules.  
 
In doing so, the Commission did not merely act as a transmission belt aggregating and 
implementing the preferences of the strongest players, as assumed by liberal 
intergovernmentalists. Rather, the Commission promoted the creation of transnational 
multiplex networks between public and private actors from the EU-15 and the 
applicant countries to a) assist, monitor and sanction institutional change in the rule 
taking countries (Andonova 2004; Bruszt and McDermott 2012; Andonova and Tuta, 
2014) and b), anticipate and alleviate those potential or actual negative developmental 
consequences of integration that could endanger the sustainability of rule transfer and 
consequently endanger the integrity of the European market making process. Instead 
of merely imposing the rules of the EU market on the evolving market economies of 
the East, the EU had to create domestic and Europe-wide capacities to plan 
transnational market integration. Rule transfer was embedded in transnational 
horizontal networks consisted of diverse private and public actors both from the rule 
taking and the integrator countries engaged in joint problem solving that focused on 
identifying sources for protracted compliance and – if needed - develop remedial 
measures (Bruszt and McDermott 2012). Instead of merely imposing uniform rules 
with uniform means in a big number of dramatically different local contexts, such 
joint learning allowed adjustments in integration strategies to diverse conditions of 
institutional backwardness.  
 
All in all, the EU differed from other regions of the world by its encompassing 
experimentations with strategies to change local conditions and increase the capacity 
of domestic actors to implement and to live by the common rules of the EU market. 
To do so, the EU has created regional capacities to anticipate and alleviate the 
potential negative developmental consequences of transferring to lesser-developed 
countries the market rules of the most developed European countries.  
 
To demonstrate our argument, we start with a general discussion of the governance 
problems faced by both the integrator and the integrated when managing economic 
integration at different levels of interdependence. The third part of the paper zooms 
into the case of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. We analyze the goals of integration 
pursued by the EU and then examine the means the EU used to pursue these goals. In 
doing so, we show how the EU tried to control the costs of integrating countries at 
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lower levels of development. We end with some concluding remarks about the lessons 
that can be learned from the Eastern enlargement for regional integration projects 




II. Integration capacities and the governance problems of economic integration 
 
 
At the most general level, economic integration refers to "measures designed to 
abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states " 
(Balassa 1976). Based on Balassa, in this paper we treat economic integration as a 
process that can have different stages, each requiring specific capacities from public 
and private economic actors and each representing different governance challenges. 
The process of economic integration, at the most elementary level, refers to a free 
trade agreement (FTA), where tariffs are eliminated between member countries. The 
process can continue with a customs union (CU), where, in addition, member states 
establish a common external tariff; a common market, where not only trade 
restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are eliminated; an economic 
union, where, in addition to the free circulation of products and factors of production, 
member states undertake "some degree of harmonization of national economic 
policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in these 
policies"; and complete economic integration, which entails "the unification of 
monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies" and "the setting-up of a supra-
national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states" (Balassa, 
1976).  
 
Enlargement of an integration process refers to including a new member state to an 
already existing integration regime by transferring its rules to the new member(s) 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The costs and benefits of integration do not 
flow automatically from rule transfer, both the rule takers (the integrated) and the rule 
makers (the integrator) have to have capacities to manage the developmental 
consequences of enlargement, increase the potential gains and reduce the potential 
costs of integration.  
 
Public and private actors in the rule taking countries might or might not have the 
capacity to manage the developmental externalities of integration. Taking over the 
rules of an already existing integration regime might provide opportunities and might 
also represent various threats for rule taking countries. The removal of tariffs, the 
joining of a custom union might give access to domestic producers to larger markets, 
it might expose domestic markets to bigger competition and increase the welfare of 
consumers. Exposure to competition to much stronger economies might also 
marginalize, or completely exclude from the integrated markets domestic producers 
who might have no capacity to withstand competitive pressure.  
 
The removal of non-tariff barriers, the imposition of common standards and 
regulations might liberate domestic markets from powerful rent-seeking groups, and it 
might increase the capacity of domestic economies to lure foreign direct investment. 
However, in economies that have weak state capacity to implement transnational 
regulations, manage the developmental externalities of rule taking, and where private 
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economic actors have weak organization and lack resources, regulatory integration 
might be the means to exclude domestic actors from the integrated markets and, 
integration might increase the peripheral status of the integrated economy (Bruszt and 
McDermott, 2014). All in all, the developmental outcomes of enlargement are 
strongly linked to the capacities of public and private actors in the rule taking 
countries. 
 
The integrator, at the most elementary level, has to have the capacity to impose and 
sanction the implementation of its rules. Mere rule transfer however is in most of the 
cases not enough to guarantee for the integrator to maximize the gains and minimize 
the potential costs of integration. The size of the costs and benefits of the integrating 
countries might depend on the evolution of the capacities of public and private actors 
in the integrated economies (Bruszt and McDermott, 2014). Economic actors in the 
integrating countries might lose potential gains and might have to take extra costs if 
economic actors in the rule taking countries have no capacity to implement the 
transferred rules in a sustainable way or, if the transferred rules are imposed 
successfully, but they result in economic and/or political crises in the rule taking 
countries. The previous problem might endanger the integrity of the common market; 
the second problem might generate political and economic costs that the integrators 
might not be able to externalize. The higher is the mismatch between uniform rules 
and the developmental faculties of actors in the rule taking countries, the bigger could 
become the pressure on the integrator to develop capacities to manage the 
developmental externalities of integration.  
 
The pressure exerted by such mismatch can depend both on the amount of rules 
transferred and on the opportunities of the integrators to externalize the 
developmental consequences of rule transfer. The bigger is the amount of transferred 
institutions and the larger the number of organizational fields affected, the higher is 
the probability of the emergence of complex social, economic and political problems 
and recurring crises in case of transferring uniform rules to a large number of 
dramatically diverse local contexts. On the other hand, the deeper are economic ties 
and the stronger are geopolitical linkages, the harder it will be for the integrator to 
externalize the developmental costs of integration and prevent the spillover of the 
negative developmental externalities to the integrating countries. At the extreme, if 
the integrating countries have no capacity to manage the developmental externalities 
of integration, and they cannot externalize their developmental costs, the enlargement 
might become a factor pushing the common market created by the rule making 
countries towards disintegration.  
 
All in all, the mode of governing integration largely shapes distributive outcomes also 
for the integrator. The key governance challenge of this mode of governing economic 
integration consequently is not how to perfect hierarchy that could impose the rules of 
the regional market. At least as important are the challenges of creating integration 
capacities for the rule makers to anticipate and manage the potential negative 
externalities of rule transfer: to collect, process, aggregate and use information in a 
host of diverse contexts, and, simultaneously create and develop the capacities of rule 
takers to plan and implement policies to alleviate the identified problems. 
 
The key governance challenges of rule transfer under conditions of “asymmetric 
interdependence” (Keohane and Victor, 2011) are linked to problems of gathering 
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information that could help to define and specify what range of the interests of the 
integrated have to be taken into account and in what ways, in order to more efficiently 
advance the interests of the rule makers. Hierarchical governance of rule transfer, on 
its own, would not be able to cope with such challenges as the two most elementary 
conditions for using hierarchy are absent: the presence of clearly defined goals and 
the knowledge of the way to reach them.  
 
Defining general developmental goals, like ‘functioning market economy’ or 
‘capacity to withstand competitive pressure’, as it has been done by the EU in 
preparation of the fifth enlargement, is one thing. Operationalizing and applying them 
in manifold diverse local contexts while defending the integrity of the EU market and 
advancing the interests of the EU member state is another.  
 
As for the transfer of EU market rules, the integrator could not possess clear and 
universally applicable guidelines about the right way to implement in a sustainable 
way the uniform EU rules in a big variety of dramatically diverse local institutional 
conditions (Héritier et al. 2001, Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003, Bulmer and 
Lequesne, 2012).  
 
In the case of the economic goals of integration, the EU either had to take as granted 
that these are policy areas in which the benchmarks of success are contested (e.g. 
“functioning market economy”), or it had to act on the assumption that there are no 
universally applicable methods to reach these goals. The information on what method 
works and what are the problems of implementation is dispersed, and, collecting and 
processing them required the mobilization of the intelligence of a big variety of 
private and pubic actors from the member states. In the rule taking countries, on the 
other hand, it required investing in the capacities of domestic actors who might have 
had stakes in gathering and using this information but who did not have the capacity 




III. The governance of economic integration during the Eastern enlargement - 
Building integration capacity of the integrator 
 
Defining the goals of integration: Minimizing negative externalities of enlargement 
 
While compliance with the acquis has always been an accession criterion in previous 
enlargements, the definition of the political and particularly the two added economic 
Copenhagen criteria in 1993 signaled the EU’s new awareness for the potential 
developmental consequences of enlargement. As interviews with EU officials 
revealed, key EU-15 member states and the Commission learned from the collapse of 
the East German economy caused by the unexpected consequences of the fast 
liberalization, the badly designed currency unification and the unplanned market 
integration after the German reunification.1 The unfolding economic and political 
turmoil, and the need for massive fiscal transfers between the two parts of Germany 
played a major role in convincing key players within the EU that future member states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Authors’ interviews with Commission officials participating in the operationalization and early phase 
implementation of the economic aspects of the Copenhagen criteria made in DG ECFIN and DG 
ELARGE, Brussels, October 2012 and April 2013. 
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must not only be democracies (political criteria) but also functioning market 
economies that are capable of withstanding competitive pressures within the 
integrated EU market (economic criteria).  
 
The added accession criteria were meant primarily to control the costs of enlargement. 
The core EU15 countries were not ready to increase considerably their contributions 
to social and economic cohesion within the enlarged union. They were not willing to 
do the same for the CEE economies what West Germany had done for East Germany 
in terms of transfer payments. The Southern members of the EU, the major recipients 
of the cohesion funds within the EU had made it clear that they want to keep their 
shares.  
 
The other fear of the EU core countries was that problems with the functioning of 
market economies and low capacity to withstand competitive pressures might not only 
present pressure for fiscal transfers but problems with the capacity in the accession 
countries to implement the acquis might also endanger the integrity of the internal 
market and distort competition. As one EU official recalls the discussion at that time: 
 
“Before we started accession negotiations with the EU-10 and even still during the 
negotiations many within the Commission feared that enlargement would risk deepening. 
Jacques Delors believed that deepening and widening of the EU don’t go together. There was 
a strong fear that enlargement would destabilize the EU including the functioning of the EU 
Internal Market. In fact, Agenda 2000 was written in that spirit and puts a lot of emphasis on 
this fear.”  
 
Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the officers of the Commission had to face the problem 
of Potemkin harmonization (Jacoby, 1999) in the accession countries, meaning simply 
that the transposed EU regulations were not implemented on the ground. Between 
1993 and 1997 the EU had signed Europe Agreements with ten Central and East 
European Countries (CEEC) which did not only regulate the reduction of tariff 
barriers in order to facilitate free trade but also foresaw gradual regulatory integration. 
In some cases EU rules remained solely on the books because public and/or private 
actors did not have the skills and resources to implement them. More often than not, 
however, these laws were left on the books also because the imposed institutional 
changes would have harmed incumbents and/or relevant constituencies. In view of 
these problems the EU-15 decided to add an accession criterion at the European 
Council in Madrid in 1995, namely that EU candidate countries must have the 
“administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis” to 
become an EU member. Moreover, the EU-15 governments at the Madrid Council 
mandated the European Commission with the preparation of Agenda 2000. In this 
document, which got published in 1997, the Commission undertook an assessment of 
the challenges of enlargement and developed a strategy on how to integrate the then 
ten candidate countries into the Union. Interestingly, the document talks several times 
about the necessity to avoid partial acquis implementation being portrayed as a major 
threat to integration: 
 
“Market distortion and prejudice to EU consumers could result from possible inadequate 
implementation of the internal market acquis. Sensitive areas in this respect include 
implementation of the acquis regulating free movement of goods, the protection of health, 
environment and consumers, indirect taxation, adequate management of the external borders, 
implementation od safety requirements and state aids. The capacity of acceding countries’ 
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administrations to manage the Community acquis will be a key element. The more this 
capacity is achieved before accession, the fewer problems will arise after it. If important 
problems were to remain after accession, protectionist political pressure could develop in both 
present and acceding Member States and could endanger the functioning of the internal 
market as a whole.” (European Commission 1997, p. 99) 
 
The introduction of the economic Copenhagen criteria did hence not imply that the 
EU formulated concrete developmental goals in a positive way or began to develop 
social or industrial policies that the accession countries have to reach in order to 
“withstand competitive pressures on the Internal Market”. The Commission did not 
have plans on such issues as how to position the economies of the CEE countries in 
the European value chains and has never set benchmarks for controlling social or 
economic exclusion. Instead, the introduction of the two economic Copenhagen 
criteria and the third criterion on administrative capacities aimed at ensuring that the 
new entrants would not threaten the integrity of the Internal Market and enlargement 
would not generate negative developmental consequences that could spill over to the 
EU15 and generate need for increased fiscal transfers. 
 
Having said that, Commission officials, who were involved in the pre-accession 
negotiations during the fifth enlargement, stressed during interviews that acquis 
implementation and related institution building in the CEEC was also considered as a 
tool to improve the countries’ business climate and investment conditions.  
 
Apart from the East German lesson, which sharpened the understanding for potential 
negative externalities of fast and uncontrolled economic integration, the Commission 
also learned a Russian lesson in the early 1990s: The ignorance of Western advisors 
towards institution building had fuelled the emergence of predatory capitalism in 
Russia.2  
 
All in all, the dominant fears of the EU member states and of the European 
Commission were twofold: that enlargement will increase the pressure for fiscal 
transfers within the union, and that the eventual partial implementation of the acquis 
by the incoming members would destabilize the Internal Market and distort 
competition. The EU could not focus solely on compliance with existing EU 
regulations as such but had to detect the sources for non-compliance and help the 
introduction of remedial measures to mitigate social costs. The next section will 
discuss how the need to deal with potential negative externalities of enlargement has 




Governance problems of economic integration from the integrator’s perspective 
 
a) The limited size of the hierarchy 
 
Part of the governance problems was linked to the human resource needs of the 
integration in pure quantitative terms. The EU, and in particular the European 
Commission as the main executor of the EU’s enlargement policy, simply lacked the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Authors’ interviews with officials who were working at DG ELARGE and were involved in planning 
the fifth enlargement, Brussels, February 2015. 
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operational capacity to manage the political and economic transformation of the post-
communist or post-War candidate countries on its own. Imagine, for example, the 
number of EU officials one can realistically expect to be needed for dealing 
effectively with the economic transformation in the candidate countries (i.e. ensuring 
that first ten and than another nine candidate countries fulfill the two economic 
criteria and comply with more than thirty various policy areas detailed in the related 
acquis chapters while also helping these economies to learn to swim in the volatile 
waters of the EU common market). Controlling the regulation and development of a 
liberal market economy of a comparable size, the US Federal bureaucracy is 
monstrous in comparison to the European one. Whereas, for example solely the US 
Department of Agriculture employs 105 thousand full time employees, or the US 
Department of Trade works with 44 thousands full time employees, the whole 
Commission has less than 24 thousand employees on its payroll. The EU bureaucracy 
can only be compared in its size to the antebellum US Federal state. The size of the 
EU bureaucracy dealing with the management of all the above-described integration 
goals in one candidate country hardly reaches the size of a football team, professional, 
administrative and infrastructural helpers included. Around 11 full-time officials and 
at best 31 part-time officials on EU payrolls work on monitoring and furthering the 
building up of a functioning market economy in an accession country, the 
implementation on the ground of the tens of thousands of pages EU market 
regulations, taking also care of governing the build up of the capacity of that national 
economy to withstand competitive pressure. 3  
 
b) Operationalizing uncertain goals of integration 
 
The governance problems are, however much deeper than the extremely limited size 
of the hierarchy. A more challenging governance dilemma comes from the fact that in 
the case of two of the economic criteria of membership, there are no clear and 
unambiguous guidelines on what actually the rule makers should impose on the rule 
takers. In the case of the third economic Copenhagen criteria, the implementation of 
the acquis, there are no universally applicable means to implement the benchmarks 
that otherwise could be defined clearly and unambiguously. These governance 
dilemmas have in common that the way the EU dealt with them could have had direct 
effects both on the amount of the costs and gains of integration and also their 
distribution between the two parts of Europe. Hence, the EU faced the challenge to 
identify the right way to manage interdependence rather than finding the right way to 
impose EU rules unilaterally reflecting the preferences of the EU15 insiders. 
Mismanagement in defining the goals for the accession countries could also have 
imposed costs on the EU member states and failure in finding the right way to enforce 
the EU rules in the accession countries could also have diminished the gains of the 
EU15 countries from the Eastern enlargement.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Authors’ interview with an official at DG ELARGE, March 2014: The 11 full time officials working 
on the economic transformation of one country are composed of 1 person on the economic accession 
criteria, 2-3 persons on economic part of the EU acquis, 1 person in the horizontal unit (all DG 
ELARGE), 1 person in DG ECFIN, 5 persons in EU Delegation. The 31 part-time officials working on 
the economic transformation of one country are composed of 3 members in the enlargement cabinet, 2 
members in ECFIN cabinet. Other Cabinets work on these issues only once to twice per year and are 
negligible. In addition, on average 26 persons work on these issues at other DGs relevant to economic 
transformation (ENTR, COMP, EMPL, AGRI, ENER, ENV, CLIMA, RTD, CNECT, MARKT, 
REGIO, TAXUD, EAC, SANCO, JUST, TRADE, EUROSTAT). 
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To start with the governance dilemma related to defining and the operationalizing a 
‘functioning market economy’: This was anything but a non-trivial task for the 
Commission in a regional integration regime in which at least three competing 
varieties of capitalism co-exist (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancké, Rhodes and 
Thatcher 2007). The concept of the functioning market economy used by 
International Finance Institutions (IFIs) changed at least four times during the 1990s 
(Bruszt, 2012) and there were no two IFIs during that decade that could agree about a 
shared definition. Except for some very general principles, the Commission has never 
published clear and unambiguous benchmarks that could guide progress in this area. 
The same was true for the second economic criteria, the existence of the capacity to 
“withstand competitive pressure within the enlarged EU”. Interviews with 
Commission officials, who dealt with the fifth enlargement, show that DG ECFIN 
does not base its assessment on specific thresholds that could signal a country’s 
capacity to withstand competitive pressures in the internal market.4 Thresholds to 
determine the ideal structure of the economy, the share of SMEs, the concentration of 
market power or the diversification of export commodities do simply not exist. In 
contrast to the fulfillment of the third Copenhagen criteria, acquis compliance, the 
Commission, and DG ECFIN in particular, had to interpret the meaning of 
competitiveness both in the assessments of the Pre-Accession Economic Programmes 
(PEPs) as well as in the regular progress reports that evaluate a candidate country’s 
progress as regards the fulfillment of all three Copenhagen criteria. To give an 
example: Obviously, a country that has successfully managed to diversify its export 
structure (e.g. by increasing the share of high-value added commodities) or has 
invested in human resources (e.g. by improving the education of skilled workers) 
received a positive assessment by DC ECFIN, while a country that was still stuck 
with 25% of unemployment or is mainly exporting low-value added goods with the 
consequence of having a trade deficit has certainly not. 5  According to one 
Commission official working for DG ECFIN during the fifth enlargement there were 
lots of discussions going on whether DG officials should promote a particular 
economic model in the various countries or whether this is the responsibility of the 
market: 
	  
“We were not really sure. We could not come up with five-year plans on how to restructure 
certain economies, of course we had an idea about whether it would be wise to shift the focus 
from heavy manufacturing to textile industry. But what we did was to come up with analyses 
to study factor endowments of countries, e.g. when we prepared the Commission’s Opinions 
on these countries before the opening of accession negotiations. This helped us to actually 
assess whether a certain proposal by an accession country, e.g. to introduce safeguard clauses 
for the shipbuilding industry, whether this would be really the right way to go about it or 
whether this is not really helpful. Further, we had lots of consultations with experts in the 
World Bank and the IMF, both headquarters and local offices in the various countries, on 
these issues. I spoke to my colleagues at the IFIs almost every day. Moreover, our EC 
delegations gained a lot of expertise over time through project experience. They knew which 
administrations to trust and whom not, where economic deficits are. We also talked to the 
private sector, to chambers of commerce. In the mid-1990s, DG ECFIN was the only DG with 
economic expertise about these countries but then gradually other line DGs also developed 
quite some expertise, like DG Enterprise, DG Agriculture and so on. These DGs had experts 
on specific countries or horizontal issues, like staid aid and they also provided very useful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Interviews with officials working at DG ECFIN, Brussels, March 2014. 
5 Interviews with officials working at DG ECFIN, Brussels, March 2014. 
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input for the PEPs, the progress reports, for our assessments of how these economies should 
develop.” 
 
The previous account suggests that DG ECFIN, which was in charge of managing the 
meeting of these two economic criteria, did not pretend to know what was the 
ultimate definition of a functioning market economy and it never even tried to use 
conditionality for the imposition of a single model on the accession countries. It did 
not define ex ante precise benchmarks for a functioning market economy or 
competitive capacities. Instead, it enrolled a set of global and regional International 
Organizations (IOs) and think tanks with partly conflicting definitions for the above 
goals to come up with alternative opinions how accession countries could converge to 
these goals6. These organizations provided the Commission with their sometimes 
conflicting assessments of what should be the necessary steps for the particular 
country under scrutiny in order to receive the status of a functioning market economy 
or to improve its competitiveness. State bureaucrats from the candidate countries or 
business representatives could reply to these models and economic ministries from the 
member states could also contest both these models and the reply of candidate 
countries to the suggestions derived from these models. The DG desk officers were 
aware of the fallibility of their own models7 and they behaved like traders in highly 
volatile and uncertain financial markets: they deployed models to check their own 
estimates against those of their rivals (Beunza and Stark, 2010).  
 
Of course, what matters from a governance perspective is not such a conceptual 
uncertainty. IFIs, like the World Bank or the IMF could impose benchmarks for 
market reforms even in the middle of the loudest contestation of their meaningfulness. 
The more serious governance problem for the Commission was that, in the shadow of 
the ruins of what was before the former GDR economy and the fear to endanger the 
integrity of the EU internal market by extending the Union to the periphery (in 
economic terms), the EU had very little room to fail. Knowing that it can not as easily 
externalize the costs of governance failure as the IFIs could, the Commission had 
strong incentives to take uncertainty about the goals and benchmarks of progressing 
towards achieving these goals seriously.  
 
In the case of the two economic accession criteria conditionality served as a 
mechanism to guarantee cooperation with the Commission in a policy dialogue that 
involved a big diversity of transnational actors and public bureaucrats from the 
member states to discuss continuously the goals and means of economic 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 These included, for example, the IFC, the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, the OECD and the KfW 
(being the only national development bank which serves as an intermediary). 
7 As one of the interviewed desk officer at DG ECFIN told us, they have informally operationalized 
their benchmarks prepared strictly for internal use only to monitor progress in these two areas and they 
were very happy when they saw their models working and yielding the expected economic outcomes. 
Authors’ interview with officials at DG ECFIN, Brussels, May 2013. 
8 Authors’ interviews with officials working at DG ELARGE and DG ECFIN, Brussels, March 2014. 
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c) Overcoming information asymmetries to detect and alleviate negative externalities 
of rule transfer 
 
As for the implementation of the rules of the common market, the governance 
dilemma in this policy area was different than in the above cases. The Commission 
could prepare more or less clear benchmarks for the administrative and behavioral 
requirements of rule compliance. On the other hand, the Commission did not posses 
and never even pretended to have clear and universally applicable guidelines about 
the right way to reach these goals in a big variety of dramatically diverse institutional 
conditions in 11 accession countries and more than thirty policy areas.  
 
Hence, the Commission had to develop its own capacity to anticipate and detect the 
sources for non-compliance, which would in turn produce negative externalities. One 
strategy was to rely on the Commission’s in-house knowledge. The line DGs basically 
circulated around the negotiating team from DG ELARGE like satellites and when a 
particular applicant country suggested certain transition periods or derogations or 
asked for financial assistance to cushion social costs of compliance with a particular 
Directive, the line DGs were always consulted to make an assessment of whether a 
derogation or an assistance project was really needed.9 In a similar vein, the line DGs 
were in permanent contact with the negotiation team to help understand why a 
candidate country would delay the process of implementation. It was the task of all 
line DGs to understand the weaknesses of candidate countries and why some of them 
would have difficulties to implement the acquis: DG AGRI would, for example, alert 
the Commission’s negotiating team for a particular candidate country of the problems 
local producers/processors face when asked to implement EU food safety regulations. 
DG ELARGE would then - in cooperation with the applicant country and DG AGRI - 
make sure that business operators receive financial support either through EU funds 
or other sources of investment, including from the IFIs. DG ENTERPRISE or COMP 
would highlight problems with state aid and – depending on the size of the problem – 
DG ELARGE in cooperation with DGs ENTERPRISE, COMP and ECFIN would ask 
countries to write plans on how to restructure the sectors (see the work by Sznajder-
Lee 2010; Trappmann 2013 for the EU’s effect on restructuring the steel sector in 
various CEEC) and initiate certain co-financing measures with IFIs.  
 
But how did the Commission officials from the various line DGs gathered the 
information that would have been necessary to define to understand why attempts to 
comply with the acquis have failed and what to do about it? In the management of 
such interdependences the field officers of the Commission had to deal with 
economies at dramatically different levels of development, endowed with very diverse 
institutional and organizational resources and helped or hindered by states with 
widely diverging capabilities (Bruszt and Langbein, 2014). The information was not 
only dispersed among a big variety of private and public actors. The problem in many 
cases was that the actors that could have collected, processed and used such 
information did not have the capacity to do so.  
 
Hence, another part of the strategy used by the Commission to cope with these 
governance problems was to create and nurture decentered intelligence in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Authors’ interviews with officials who were in charge of pre-accession negotiations during the fifth 
enlargement, Brussels, February 2015. 
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accession countries. As previously discussed the Commission asked candidate 
countries to come up with a big variety of various plans on how, when and with what 
kinds of resources they want to meet the accession criteria. During the screening 
process, for example, candidates had to come up with National Programmes for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). In relation to the various pre-assistance programmes 
during the 2004/07 enlargements, such as SAPARD10, the candidates were asked to 
prepare National Agricultural and Rural Development Plans. The development of 
national economic strategies has been important for candidate countries to receive a 
positive assessment from the EU Commission as regards access to pre-accession 
assistance such as IPA.11 Further, DG ECFIN asked candidate countries to prepare the 
previously mentioned PEPs, i.e. annual economic plans on how to achieve 
macroeconomic and financial stability and to deal with structural problems in order to 
meet the economic Copenhagen criteria upon accession. State bureaucrats from the 
candidate countries working in the various areas were trained to come up with 
complex plans following the Commission’s methodology (Bruszt and McDermott 
2012).  
 
The Commission orchestrated this planning exercise by sending thousands of experts, 
private consultants or bureaucrats from EU member states, to the candidate countries 
who advised the local state bureaucracies how to write their first plans in the various 
areas. While in many cases these consultants have produced a cacophony of advices 
and they could have represented widely diverging models for public policy making, 
they have helped to convey the key message to public actors in the accession 
countries: while planning is a key aspect of doing business in the common market, 
there are no universal models for doing so.12  
 
The Commission relied on various formats in order to monitor progress of a 
(potential) candidate with meeting the accession criteria. This aspect of governance, 
again, used methods that allowed collecting and contrasting a big variety of dispersed 
information enlisting the mobilization of resources of diverse private and public 
actors. Just to give the example of the process of the preparation of a progress report, 
desk officers in the country units of DG ELARGE and at various DGs approached a 
big variety of actors to receive much-needed input. They enlisted a variety of private 
and public intermediaries, such as local business associations, NGOs, the Central 
Bank or the Chamber of Commerce, that were asked to share their knowledge about 
the progress achieved in the various areas and key problems as regards the meeting of 
the political and economic criteria as well as achieving acquis compliance. Rather 
than engaging in pure “checklist monitoring” the Commission asked these 
intermediaries to suggest solutions to overcome a candidate’s problems with meeting 
the accession criteria. Experts coming either from the member state governments or 
from the private sector of the member states to work in twinning or other technical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 SAPARD: Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development. In June 1999, the 
EU passed Council Regulation (EC) No. 1268/99 on Community support for pre-accession measures 
for agriculture and rural development in the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe to 
prepare the candidate to take on EU acquis for agriculture and food safety. 
11 The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) offers assistance to accession countries in the 
period 2007-2013. IPA funds aim at strengthening institutional capacities, social, economic and rural 
development and cross-border cooperation (European Council 2006). Interviews with Polish officials 
who participated in Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU, Warsaw, July 2014. 
12 Author’s interviews with officials at DG ELARGE and ECFIN, Brussels, March 2012 and March 
2014; Interview with former Polish accession negotiators, Warsaw, July 2014. 
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assistance projects with the candidate countries were also used as sources for the 
reports. This circumstance hints towards the fact that intermediaries were 
multifunctional: On the one hand, twinning experts helped building much needed 
state capacity in the candidates, thus they contribute not only rule enforcement but 
also to strengthening the capacity of state administration to anticipate positive and 
negative externalities of enlargement (Bruszt and Langbein 2014). On the other hand 
twinning experts served as informal monitors for the Commission as they had up-to-
date knowledge of the progress achieved in their areas of expertise and/or of the 




IV. Tentative conclusions 
 
Our primary goal in this paper was to contribute to the creation of a more solid basis 
for the assessment of how the EU governed economic integration during the Eastern 
enlargement. Before judging with what results these strategies helped to manage 
interdependence between European core and periphery, whether there are any lessons 
from the Eastern enlargement that could be used in other parts of the world, we have 
to understand what actually were the goals of the European integration regime and 
what were the means it used to further them. 
 
Our key argument in this paper was that the EU had to cope with the governance 
problems of asymmetric interdependence while extending the rules of the regional 
market to the lesser-developed parts of Europe. The dilemmas it has faced are similar 
to the dilemmas any other integration regime has to face that involve countries at 
different levels of development into transnational market making, be it regional, inter-
regional or global. From the perspective of the governance of interdependence, the 
EU had to deal with two types of potential negative developmental externalities:  
 
First, the implementation of EU rules could have imposed prohibitive costs on some 
categories on economic actors in the rule taking countries and it could have 
diminished or undermined their competitiveness within the regional markets. Not 
planning transnational market making and merely leaving developmental outcomes of 
integration to the market could have marginalized and destabilize weaker economies 
While the stronger economies of the regional market retained their control over the 
rules of the integration, they had stakes in controlling the developmental externalities 
of integration as not doing so would have diminished the potential gains and increased 
the potential costs of enlargement. Second, partial or non-implementation of the rules 
of the regional market could have endangered the functioning of the Internal Market 
and distort competition: It could have given competitive advantage to economic actors 
in the accession countries and could have appeared in the old member states in the 
form of lost workplaces and diminished tax revenues. Hence the Commission, in 
particular, did not only care about the CEEC’s capacity to play by the EU rules. The 
Commission also had to care about the CEEC’s capacity to live by them in order to 
avoid large scale backsliding with regard to acquis compliance in the post-accession 
period.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interview with EU official, DG ELARGE, Brussels, March 2014. 
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In transferring the EU rules, conditionality definitely played an important role in 
shaping the speed and the scope of cooperation in the governance of interdependence. 
Without experimenting with non-hierarchical methods, however, the rule makers 
would have flown blind: could not have controlled the externalities of rule transfer 
and could even have undermined the conditions of the success of rule transfer.  
 
The limitations of this mode of governing rule transfer have to do with the selectivity 
of the management of interdependence. Negative developmental consequences of rule 
transfer in the rule taking countries mattered to the extent they could endanger the 
interests of the integrating countries. The highly asymmetrical distribution of 
decision-making rights during integration did not allow for considering longer-term 
developmental interests of the rule taking countries. This mode of governing 
integration might have helped to bring eleven fledgling market economies afloat into 
the strongest regional market in the globe. However, for the post-accession period the 
EU does not have either the administrative or the infrastructural powers to further 
pursue the tasks of managing interdependences among member states at different 
levels of development. Leaving this task primarily to the regional market might still 
prove that the EU needs more activist policies both for its Eastern and Southern 
peripheries. In developing the administrative and infrastructural powers to do so, the 
EU might rely on the experiences and lessons of the mode of governance invented for 
the pre-accession integration of the CEE economies. Orchestrated by DG 
Enlargement, the transnational network of private and public actors displayed 
functions that a Federal Ministry of Economy would be doing in any ordinary federal 
state: anticipate and manage developmental problems of interdependent economies at 
the level of local economies, sectors, territorial units and diverse categories of 
economic actors. Such a governance mode might increase the capacity of the evolving 
EU state to see and manage diversity within the regional market and increase the 
probability of mutually beneficial outcomes while decreasing the probability of the 
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